

ANDOCIDES AND THE PEACE OF CIMON

WESLEY E. THOMPSON

ACCORDING TO ANDOCIDES (*De pace* 3), the Athenians recalled Miltiades, the son of Cimon, from exile to conclude a peace with Sparta. καὶ τότε ἡμῖν εἰρήνη ἐγένετο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτη πέντε (*sic, codd.*), καὶ ἐνεμείναμεν ἀμφοτέρω ταύταις ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἔτη τριακαίδεκα (4). Aeschines (*De fals. leg.* 172), drawing on Andocides, says that Miltiades made a fifty-year peace which lasted thirteen years. Clearly Andocides wrote Μιλτιάδην τὸν Κίμωνος, confusing the name with the patronymic. What number did he write? Editors normally print πεντήκοντα in both authors, with Albin, for one, arguing that a scribe familiar with the five-year truce mentioned by Thucydides (1.112.1) corrected what Andocides actually wrote ("fifty") to what our manuscripts now have ("five").¹ While Albin can cite no parallel for such a correction, Glenn Bugh now adduces two examples of Aeschines' altering statements by Andocides which must have appeared impossible on their face.² Where Andocides seems to say that in the 450s Athens built one hundred ships to replace those which fought at Salamis and also established a cavalry corps for the first time, Aeschines says that they added the ships and horsemen to those which they already had.³ This supports the view that he also corrected Andocides' seemingly impossible assertion that the parties observed a five-year truce for thirteen years.

The strongest reason for believing that Andocides actually wrote "five" has escaped notice: his rhetorical strategy requires it. As John J. Bateman says, "In studying a speech, purportedly delivered to a specific audience where particular issues, emotions, and attitudes are at work, one must attempt to define and evaluate the actual speech situation as well as its general historical setting."⁴ In asking for approval of a treaty which he negotiated with the Spartans, Andocides was facing a hostile audience.⁵ Many

¹Umberto Albin, *Andocide: De Pace* (Florence 1964) 57–58.

²Glenn B. Bugh, "Andocides, Aeschines, and the Three Hundred Athenian Cavalrymen," *Phoenix* 36 (1982) 306–312; cf. also Michel Nouhaud, *L'utilisation de l'histoire par les orateurs attiques* (Paris 1982) 230–231.

³And. *De pace* 5 and Aeschin. *De fals. leg.* 173; Bugh (above, n. 2) 308–309, argues that Andocides "does not deny the existence of cavalry previously, but rather attests the creation of a different kind of cavalry organization." On Andocides and the ships cf. David Blackman, "The Athenian Navy and Allied Contributions in the Pentecontaetia," *GRBS* 10 (1969) 208–212.

⁴J. J. Bateman, "Albin, Andocide, de pace" *Gnomon* 37 (1965) 658.

⁵For the revival of Athenian imperial ambitions and Andocides' attempts to deal with this issue in the *De pace* see especially Robin Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism," *JHS* 87 (1967) 95–99 and 104–108. Andocides is on the defensive through-

favored a revival of Athenian imperialism and continuation of the war, while many others had good reason to fear another treaty with Sparta after the agreement of 404 resulted in the tyranny of the Thirty. The orator, therefore, shows in sections 3 to 9 how previous treaties with Sparta, far from leading to the overthrow of the constitution and the other evils of 404 (the loss of the walls, the ships, and the overseas possessions), actually strengthened Athens and its democracy. Once he has shown that the terms of the treaty favor Athens, he must face the tremendous obstacle of proving that the Spartans will respect those terms in practice, for his listeners remembered all too well how a dozen years earlier Lysander, declaring the Athenians in violation of the treaty of capitulation, pressured them into turning power over to the Thirty.⁶ The rhetorical situation thus demands that Andocides make it seem that earlier treaties have lasted, and he must not call attention to any breaches, especially when Sparta was the violator.

Thus he specifies the actual duration of only one of the four pacts between the two cities. He does not remind his audience of what Thucydides tells his reader, that the Spartans broke the thirty-year truce after fourteen years (2.2.1, cf. 7.18.2). In fact, he contrives to leave the impression that this treaty ran its full course: the ambassadors, he says (6), "made peace for us with the Spartans for thirty years. And in such a long time (*ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ*) where was the democracy destroyed?" He does not mention that the Peace of Nicias lasted not quite seven years, nor, of course, Lysander's threat to treat the Athenians as *παρασπόνδους*.⁷ Nowhere in the speech does he

out the speech, and Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F 149a) seems to say that the orator was banished for his part in making the treaty. I. A. F. Bruce, however, argues, (in "Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," *Historia* 15 [1966] 272–281) that Philochorus means that Andocides was exiled after the Peace of Antalcidas.

⁶Lys. 12.74–76; cf. Diod. 14.3.6–7. Though the former implicates Theramenes in the Spartan *diktai* while the latter exculpates him, they both agree on Lysander's invalidation of the treaty. Even earlier, Alcibiades was able to call the Spartans *οὐ βεβαίους* (Thuc. 5.43.3) and argue that they made the Peace of Nicias with the intention of renewing the war once they had isolated Athens from Argos. Andocides' opponents could make the same charge with much greater plausibility. [Besides making other valuable suggestions for improving this paper, a referee pertinently asks why Andocides did not hit upon the argument "that while Lysander was a temporary aberration, Pausanias [who reversed his policies] represented steadfast adherence to [the] treaty agreements of 404 B.C." The answer would seem to be that during the Corinthian War the Spartans repudiated their king's honorable behavior by condemning him to death because, *inter alia*, he let the Athenian demos go unpunished (*ἀνῆκε*): cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25.]

⁷Lys. 12.74–76. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 34.3) and Diodorus (14.3.2) say that the treaty of 404 guaranteed Athens its *patrios politeia*, but Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.2.20) and Andocides (especially *De pace* 11) omit this provision from their descriptions of the agreement. Scholars are not agreed where the truth lies (cf. W. James McCoy, "Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* and the Establishment of the Thirty Tyrants," *YSC* 24 [1975] 131–145), but even if Lysander did not violate a precise stipulation, he still proposed to set aside the entire treaty.

blame Sparta for breaking a truce. It is the Athenians, urged on by the Argives, who invade Laconia and bring an end to the Peace of Nicias;⁸ it is Athenian exiles (not Lysander) who are responsible for the installation of the Thirty (12).

Realizing, then, what Andocides was trying to prove, and noting that he does not say how long the other three treaties lasted, we can surely deduce the reason he does tell his audience the duration of the Peace of Cimon: it enables him to say that the treaty exceeded its original time limit.⁹

George Kennedy has shown that when he wrote the *De reductu* in 411 "Andocides had no training in the sophistic rhetoric," but before composing the *De pace* he had absorbed the teachings of the rhetorical handbooks. "The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (32) gives a fuller list of appropriate topics [for a deliberative speech]: justice, legality, expediency, honor, pleasantness, facility, practicability, and necessity. . . . [I]n the *De Reditu*, which was also a deliberative speech, Andocides failed to develop such topics. In the *De Pace*, on the other hand, he makes such extensive use of them that it is clear that he is aware of the kind of arguments expected." Kennedy concludes that the *De pace* "shows a steady hand in dealing with the material and subtlety in maintaining the goodwill of the audience."¹⁰ In particular, Andocides displays considerable skill in presenting policy choices on an "either/or" basis. In saying that Athens must make peace along with her Boeotian allies or continue the war in concert with Argos (24–28), he ignores the possibility that, should Athens reject the treaty, Boeotia will not opt for a separate peace.¹¹ Again he argues (26) that, if Athens prevails in combat, Corinth will become Argos' prize, while an Athenian defeat will mean Spartan control of Corinth. Once more he masks the chance that the Athenians can dominate Corinth themselves.¹² Only by suppressing these alternatives, can Andocides—now the professional orator—seem to build his case on compelling logic.

In the same way, a skilled speaker who advocates peace on the basis of precedents will not remind his audience that a fifty-year pact was broken after thirteen years. On the contrary, by saying that Sparta abided by its five-year agreement for thirteen years, Andocides is suggesting that they can be trusted to observe the treaty which he has arranged.

Thucydides and Andocides both, then, have a five-year treaty followed by a

⁸Cf. *De pace* 9 and 31. The Argives are, of course, the main opponents of Andocides' treaty (cf. 27).

⁹In the phrase *ἐνεμείναμεν ἀμφοτέροι ταύταις ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἔτη τριακαίδεκα*, *ἀμφοτέροι* is used to show that not only "we," but also the Spartans adhered to the terms of the agreement.

¹⁰George A. Kennedy, "The Oratory of Andocides," *AJP* 79 (1958) 32–43, at 42.

¹¹The Boeotians, as it turned out, did not agree to a separate peace.

¹²According to Diodorus (14.92.1–2), Iphicrates later attempted to seize Corinth, but Aelius Aristides (13.168) denies the charge; cf. also Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34.

thirty-year agreement. In Thucydides the earlier pact runs from 451/0 to 446/5;¹³ although he does not explicitly connect Cimon with the treaty, he probably thought that Cimon negotiated the settlement upon his return to Athens after ten years in exile. Andocides, on the other hand, clearly followed the ancient tradition (found in Nepos¹⁴ and, so it seems, Theopompus¹⁵) that Cimon was recalled in the fifth year of his banishment. Thus, in all probability, this version of Athenian history placed the ostracism in 462/1, the return and peace in 458/7, and the breach in 446/5.¹⁶

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS

¹³Cf. Thuc. 1.112–115.1, with B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* 3 (Princeton 1950) 158–180, especially 173–174; see also A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1944) 395 and 413, and R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 124–125.

¹⁴Nepos *Cim.* 3.3: *post annum quintum quam expulsus erat, in patriam revocatus est*. The Latin idiom is sometimes misconstrued: Nepos means, in the fifth year according to inclusive reckoning. Cicero, for instance, left Rome on XIII K. Febr. in 49 (*Att.* 7.10) and later received a letter dated X K. Febr.: *Hoc scribis post diem quartum quam ab urbe discessimus* (*Att.* 9.10.4). Again, Cato, giving instructions for pressing an olive crop, says (*Agr.* 65.1), *Postridie aut post diem tertium, quam lecta erit, facito*. Only “the next day or the day after” makes sense here. This corresponds to the Greek, *τῇ ὑστεραία συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ ταῦτὰ καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ* (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.7.5), referring to the dying Cyrus’ lack of appetite. Cf. also 6.3.11, *ἐχθές δὲ καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν*, “yesterday and the day before.”

¹⁵*FGH Hist* 115 F 88; I follow the interpretation by A. E. Raubitschek, “Kimons Zurückberufung,” *Historia* 3 (1954/55) 379–380, against that of Meiggs (above, n. 13) 422–423; see also the discussion by W. R. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens* (Washington 1968) 24–30.

¹⁶The argument for “five” rather than “fifty” does not depend on this interpretation of the chronology; the procedure is just the reverse. One must also reject the proposal by Peter Paul Dobree, *Adversaria* 1 (Berlin 1874) 166–167, to transpose *καὶ ἐνεμείναμεν . . . τριακαίδεκα* from section 4 to section 6, which would then read, “They made a peace for us with the Spartans for thirty years, and we both remained in this treaty for thirteen years.” Hunter Rawlings, in “The Arche of Thucydides’ War,” (*Arktouros*, eds G. W. Bowersock, W. Burkert, and M. C. J. Putnam [Berlin 1979] 276 and n. 8) argues that “Thucydides’ dispute is not with those who thought that the war began *later*, with the invasion of Attica, but with those who believed it began *earlier*, with the events at Epidamnus and Potidaea That this was a prevalent view in the fifth century is clear from Aristophanes’ *Peace* (987–990), where the war which ended in 421 is called the 13-year war. Cf. also the (admittedly confused) passage in Andocides, 3.3 (Aeschines 2.172), where what is presumed to be the peace of 446/5 is said to have lasted 13 years.” In sections 3–9 Andocides is only concerned with wars and treaties between Athens and Sparta. Accordingly, he omits the Peace of Callias and the Sicilian Expedition. He even ignores the battle of Mantinea in 418 since the Peace of Nicias continued in effect. Likewise the thirty-year truce persisted despite Epidamnus and Potidaea. One would expect Andocides, therefore, to date the rupture of that treaty—if he chose to specify—to Sparta’s entry into the war. He says, moreover, in section 8 that what we call the Archidamian War was fought on account of the Megarians. Thus it has nothing to do with Epidamnus and Potidaea, and everything to do

with the Spartan demand, just before the invasion of Attica, for the repeal of the Megarian Decree (Thuc. 1.139.1). The Aristophanes passage is much disputed, and some critics argue that the poet uses "thirteen" as the proverbial unlucky number without intending to say the war has lasted that precise number of years (cf. Maurice Platnauer's edition [Oxford 1964] *ad loc.*). There is no good reason for thinking that Andocides wrote that the thirty-year agreement of 446/5 lasted thirteen years. For a full discussion of *De pace* 3–9 cf. W. E. Thompson, "Andocides and Hellanicus," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 483–490.